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Introduction:  The Importance of 1987 
 Erich Honecker’s visit to West Germany lasted just five days, from September 7, 
1987 to September 11, but it was the crowning moment of fifteen years of work on the 
part of both governments.  More than Helmut Schmidt’s 1981 visit to the German 
Democratic Republic, Honecker’s visit was intensely symbolic: the East German flag 
fluttered in Bonn, both states’ anthems were played, and Honecker, with full diplomatic 
entourage in tow, was greeted in almost the same manner as any other visiting head of 
state.  Honecker and Kohl appeared at joint conferences, participated in “working 
sessions” together, and, for all appearances, conducted a normal diplomatic visit. 
 The visit accomplished little tangible change in the diplomatic relations between 
the two states.  In a joint communiqué on September 8, 1987, the two leaders agreed to 
“make a special effort on behalf of a peaceful coexistence in Europe” and “develop 
normal neighborly relations with each other on the basis of equality.”  They pledged 
advancements in areas where the two states had recently made progress, such as in family 
visits, and worked to increase inter-German trade, calling it “the most important 
stabilizing element in overall relations1.”  The trip made very little difference, however, 
in the major issues affecting the day.  Nor, in many cases, was it expected to.  The West 
German public had limited confidence in the ability of the Honecker-Besuch to effect any 
real change in the status quo between the two states: before the visit, a poll found that less 
than one-fifth believed Honecker’s trip “would seriously promote political unity2.”  Few 
                                                
1 Erich Honcker and Helmut Kohl. “Joint Communiqué by Erich Honecker and Helmut 
Kohl, 8 September 1987, Neues Deutschland, September 9, 1987;” in Ein Erfolg der 
Politik der Vernunft und des Realismus (Berlin: Dietz, 1987), 39. 
2 Schmemann, Serge.  “Honecker Visit to West Stirs More Curiosity than Passion,” The 
New York Times, September 13, 1987. 
expected relations to improve dramatically, and few expected any significant changes in 
the policies of the GDR or the FRG as a result of the visit.  That ultimate goal for some 
Germans, unification, was almost completely unthinkable by the 1980s.  Despite frequent 
public proclamations by Kohl and other CDU leaders that “der nationale Auftrag bleibt 
gültig und erfüllbar: … in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands 
zu vollenden3,” most, likely including the Chancellor himself, believed that unification 
was highly unlikely.  A poll taken in the same year as Honecker’s visit found only three 
percent of West Germans “expected to see it in the foreseeable future,” with seventy-two 
percent calling it “unlikely4.”  Expectations for tangible results during Honecker’s visit 
were thus quite low, and the trip itself produced little in the way of breakthrough 
diplomacy. 
 What, then, to make of it?  The press was largely uncommitted on the meaning of 
the trip.  The New York Times called the legacy of the visit a “puzzle5.”  The Economist 
mused that “Honecker hardly conquered the crowds6,” Die Zeit questioned whether it was 
an “Ende oder Anfang7,” and Der Spiegel admitted that “die Gründe für Honeckers 
                                                
3 Helmut Kohl. “Bericht von Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl zur Lage der Nation im 
geteilten Deutschland,” in Bulletin: Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government 30 (1984): 261-68, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2106 (accessed Nov. 1, 2009). Translation (Allison 
Brown, GHDI): “The national task remains valid and achievable: to bring about the unity 
and freedom of Germany in free self-determination.”  
4 Peter Merkl, German Unification in the European Context (University Park, 
Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 125. 
5 Schmemann, Serge.  “Honecker Flies Home, Leaving a Puzzle Behind,” The New York 
Times, September 12, 1987. 
6 “A German among Germans,” The Economist, September 12, 1987. 
7 Leicht, Robert.  “Gute Deutsche und gute Europäer?” Die Zeit, September 11, 1987.  
Translation (mine):  “end or beginning.” 
Zurückhaltung kennt niemand genau8.”  The two governments, as could be expected, 
took different angles on the trip.  For the East Germans, it was a confirmation of their 
long-sought goal of political sovereignty.  On September 15, the East German Politburo 
was briefed on the visit in glowing terms.  The Politburo heard that Honecker’s visit 
demonstrated to “the whole world the independence and equal status of the two German 
states and underscored their sovereignty.”  This in itself was reason enough for the trip 
and was the culmination of Honecker’s long career in East German politics.  Since the 
postwar division of Germany, the GDR had sought diplomatic recognition from the FRG 
and the wider West.  It had long felt maligned by West German policies designed to 
make it a sort of ‘German Taiwan,’ diplomatically and economically isolated from the 
rest of the world.  When Honecker came to power in 1971, policies such as the Hallstein 
Doctrine, under which West Germany would recognize no state that gave diplomatic 
recognition to the East, were the basic fact of German-German relations.  Sixteen years 
later, as leader of the East German state, he stood in front of the West German 
Chancellery on what was, for all practical purposes, a state visit to Bonn.  This must be 
seen as an enormous personal and political victory for the General Secretary.  His foreign 
minister met with his FRG counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, lending credence to 
Honecker’s argument that the GDR was a sovereign state.   And indeed, at the time of the 
visit, this was seen to be the case.  While Honecker publicly pronounced that with time, 
the German-German border could become similar in nature to the German-Polish border, 
the Politburo heard that his trip was “a powerful blow to all revanchist and ‘intra-
German’ efforts.”  They took satisfaction in the FRG’s seeming acceptance of the GDR’s 
                                                
8 “Honecker-Besuch: Erste Adresse,” Der Spiegel, September 7, 1987. Translation 
(mine):  “No one knows the exact reasons for Honecker’s reticence.”  
sovereignty, especially given the current government’s conservative bent.  In trade, the 
trip “strengthen[ed] the GDR as an equal partner in its relations with capitalist industrial 
countries9.” 
 For Kohl, the visit was to be cast in a different light.  “The visit by Mr. Honecker 
did not change the state of affairs in Germany,” argued West German Minister of the 
Interior Wolfgang Schäuble in a November 1987 speech at London’s Chatham House.  
“We are not abandoning the goal enshrined in our constitution…that the entire German 
people are called upon to achieve…the unity and freedom of Germany.”  Far from 
putting “a seal on the division of Germany,” Schäuble argued, the visit was merely “a 
meeting between Germans10.”  Even as Kohl acknowledged the separateness of the GDR, 
the CDU was unwilling to make the final concessions toward East Germany, still 
insisting that it was not a separate nation.  On Honecker’s first day in Bonn, Kohl told 
him that “die Bundesrepublik hält fest an der Einheit der Nation…daß alle Deutschen in 
gemeinsamer Freiheit zueinander finden können11.”  In his memoirs, Helmut Kohl wrote 
that the purpose of Honecker’s visit was specifically to push “das innerdeutsche Tor noch 
weiter öffnen12.”  At the same time, the importance of the visit was not lost on Kohl.  Of 
the decision to officially extend to Honecker the invitation to visit the FRG, he wrote: 
                                                
9 “SED-Politbürovorlage vom 15. September 1987 über den offiziellen Besuch von Erich 
Honecker in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 7. bis 11. September,” in 
Die SED. Geschichte, Organisation, Politik. Ein Handbuch, ed. Andreas Herbst, Gerd-
Rüdiger Stephan, and Jürgen Winkler (Berlin: Dietz, 1997), 788-94.  
10 Wolfgang Schäuble,  “Relations between the Two States in Germany,” International 
Affairs 64.2, (1988): 209-210. 
11 Helmut Kohl.  “Niederschrift über die Gespräche Kohl-Honecker am 7. und 8. 
September 1987 (Bonn),” in Die Koalition der Vernunft, ed. Heinrich Potthoff  (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), 582.  Translation (mine):  “The Federal Republic 
holds strongly to national unity…that all Germans could find freedom together.”   
12 Helmut Kohl, Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Ullstein Buchverlage, 1996),  
31.  Translation (mine):  “the inner-German door even further open.” 
“Das war wohl bis zum Jahre 1989 die wichstigste innerdeutsche Entscheidung, die ich 
persönlich gesträubt hat13,” he wrote.  To Kohl, the visit, through its mass media 
coverage in the GDR, was also a way to directly engage the East German people and 
provided “die Möglichkeit…sich direct an die siebzehn Millionen Landsleute in der DDR 
zu wenden14.”  Most importantly for Kohl, the exchange showcased what he saw as the 
unbreakable unity of the German people.  Honecker’s poignant visit to his Saarland 
hometown, and particularly his reunion with his sister, encapsulated the devastating 
effects of division and bolstered Kohl’s argument for increased visits, if not an eventual, 
theoretical reunification. 
Finally, should the visit should not be seen in the context of a political or personal 
relationship between Honecker and Kohl.  Honecker made no secret of his preference for 
the policies of the SPD over those of Kohl’s CDU; the East German Politburo was told 
that his visit “reinforced the process of differentiation within the government coalition” 
as well as “positively influenced support for the policies of the SPD15.”  Honecker met 
with regional leaders of the SPD in the hopes that “sein Besuch…der SPD helfen wird16.”  
Likewise, Kohl continued to emphasize the demands he had made of the GDR since 
becoming chancellor, such as liberalization of East German restrictions on media and 
visitation, and economic and political reform.  In addition, he continued to apply pressure 
                                                
13 Ibid., Translation (mine): “That was probably the most important inner-German 
decision that I had personally struggled with until 1989.” 
14 Ibid., Translation (mine): “the opportunity…to address the seventeen million 
compatriots of the GDR directly.” 
15 Herbst 788-94 
16 “Vermerk über ein Gespräch Honecker mit dem Vorsitzenden der SPD-Fraktion im 
Landtag von Schleswig-Holstein, Björn Engholm, 8. September 1987,” in Die Koalition 
der Vernunft, ed. Heinrich Potthoff  (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), 
618. Translation (mine): “would help the SPD.” 
on Honecker’s regime after the visit and played an important role in his eventual 
downfall, telling Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989 that “we now understand 
Moscow far better and feel much closer to it than Berlin” and that Honecker “show[ed] 
no interest” in Soviet policies.  In 2006, Der Spiegel referred to Kohl’s 1988 visit to 
Moscow as “the beginning of the end for Honecker17.”  
What was most remarkable about the visit was not, then, what occurred while Erich 
Honecker was on West German soil, but rather the events that led up to the visit.  As the 
German and international press noted, the visit was a milestone in postwar history, one 
that would not have been possible in previous years.  Indeed, a Honecker visit in 1984 
had been cancelled by Moscow, angry over NATO missile deployments in the Federal 
Republic and what it saw as East Berlin’s overly friendly approach to the West Germans.  
In terms of divided Germany’s long-term history, the visit was even more remarkable.  
Until 1971, when Ulbricht was forced to resign his post as SED General Secretary, the 
GDR “opposed the Soviet urging for better relations with the Federal Republic18.”  The 
FRG, for its part, clung to the Hallstein Doctrine until the election of Brandt in 1969 
brought the changes of Ostpolitik.  During the 1950s and 1960s, Adenauer and other 
West German politicians referred to the GDR simply as “the Zone19,” as if it were some 
forgotten or condemned part of Germany proper.  Now, the East German flag flew over 
Bonn as a Federal Chancellor stood at attention for the GDR’s national anthem.  It would 
have been unthinkable fifteen years earlier.  But beginning with the signing of the Basic 
                                                
17 Christian Neef, “Diary of a Collapsing Superpower,” Der Spiegel, November 22, 2006, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,449326,00.html (accessed November 
1, 2009). 
18 Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein, 1992), 216. 
19 Brandt 219 
Treaty (1972) and leading up to 1987, a transformation had occurred in intra-German 
relations that allowed the Honecker-Besuch to become reality.  The improved ties 
survived the fall of Schmidt’s Ostpolitik-supporting SPD government in 1982; in fact, 
relations continued to improve under the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition.  During the 1980s, 
inter-German ties continued to develop despite an escalation in hostility between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  While the Brezhnev government of 1971 urged East 
Berlin to develop closer ties with the West, the international climate had turned against 
such ties by the mid-1980s as the détente of the 1970s gave way to an increasingly warm 
Cold War.  By 1984, both Chernenko and Reagan expressed concern over their respective 
German allies’ newfound sense of cooperation. 
What this indicates, then, is that the two Germanies were able to develop something 
of an independent course from their respective superpowers.  This must be qualified; both 
states were secondary members of opposing military alliances whose decisions were 
almost entirely controlled by the dominant powers, the United States and Soviet Union.  
It would be farcical to suggest that the FRG and especially the GDR had a great deal of 
freedom to chart their own political course; their very existence as states was intertwined 
with the superpowers that had created them in the 1940s.  Yet the actions of Honecker 
and Kohl suggest that the development of their “Coalition of Reason” did herald an 
increase in the ability of the two Germanies to plot their own course, ending, of course, in 
the dramatic collapse of the East German state in 1989 and ultimately unification, despite 
the reservations of Gorbachev, Thatcher, and Mitterrand.  Their coalition was not one of 
close friendship but rather of mutual respect and a shared knowledge of the implications 
of a failure to work together.  In many ways, Kohl and Honecker’s relationship mirrored 
the paths their countries would take.  Though they were born less than one hundred 
kilometers apart in southwestern Germany, they were from completely opposite ends of 
the political spectrum.  Honecker was a lifelong communist, the son of Saarland 
coalminers.  He had cut his teeth as a KPD partisan during the Weimar years and spent 
World War II in prison for it.  Prior to becoming head of the SED, Honecker had 
overseen construction of the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the East German oppression that 
Kohl so vehemently denounced.  Meanwhile, Kohl represented a party that was anathema 
to Honecker; his CDU was seen by many in the GDR leadership and was often portrayed 
in official propaganda as the heir to National Socialism.  And yet these two men, like the 
countries they represented, realized that the benefits of limited cooperation outweighed 
those of escalating tensions.  Thus, Germany emerged as an exception to the increasingly 
heated Cold War in the 1980s.  Honecker firmly believed and openly remarked “that 
deteriorating relations between the World Powers need not necessarily affect the 
relationship between the two German states.20”  He spoke of a “German way,” 
differentiated from the policies of the superpowers by its emphasis on détente and peace.  
The German situation was unique in mid-1980s East-West relations.  This was the result 
of many individual factors that aligned to create an environment in which an inter-
German détente could flourish.   
Chief among these, and the most readily apparent, was the fact that East and West 
Germany were artificial constructions made from the ruins of a single state.  No other 
country in Europe shared the unique situation occupied by the two Germanies.  While 
members of opposing military and political alliances, they were nevertheless, as Kohl 
                                                
20 Brandt 433 
liked to point out, carved out of a single nation and retained many of the ties that had 
bound them as a Volk.  East and West Germany shared the same language, a similar 
history and a shared political identity from 1871-1945, and, increasingly in the 1980s, the 
same icons21.  No other two countries straddled the divide between East and West in the 
way that the FRG and the GDR did, and no other two countries could have.  Furthermore, 
as artificial constructions, the two Germanies were unusually bound to their respective 
superpowers, especially in the early postwar years but continuing to unification.  
Technically, West Germany was still occupied by France, Great Britain, and the United 
States until 1990.  Neither state’s history, or reason for existence, was completely 
grounded; East Germany’s raison d’etre was a tenuous mix of socialist internationalism 
and peace activism, while the West saw itself as the continuation of the Weimar Republic 
that was interrupted by Nazism, and moreover the only true representation of Germany.   
Yet both states had a flexible basis on which to pursue a change in relations—they 
were able to change the definitions of what constituted the state rather effectively from 
opposition to the “other” Germany to a more balanced coexistence.  Finally, as inheritors 
of the debt of 1945, both East and West Germany felt a historical obligation to promote 
peace and détente in Europe.  The official proclamations of both states were littered with 
                                                
21 While East German political construction had for most of its history rejected pre-1949 
non-Communist German figures as antithetical to the state, the 1980s saw a gradual 
reversal of this policy.  East Germany moved to embrace, in a limited way, the “German” 
part of German socialism.  While the state continued to denounce those historical figures 
it saw as advocating views that ran contrary to state ideology, it also began 
commemorating those seen as ‘proto-Communist’—figures like Luther, who had stood 
up to the dominant power of the day.   Additionally, the GDR made a noticeable shift 
toward commemorating German history.  A famous example of this would be the state’s 
treatment of Frederick the Great, whose statue was returned to Unter den Linden in the 
early 1980s.  These changes provoked debate not only in East Germany, but also in the 
West, where some sought to deny East Germany the heritage of what were seen as 
essentially “Western” historical figures. 
utterances that war should “never again” emanate from Germany.  In the East, where 
‘peace’ was part of the official state dogma, this theme was even more important, but the 
West also had a sizeable, and by the 1980s growing, movement that demanded a more 
pacifist worldview, beginning with rapprochement with the GDR.  This pacifist 
movement in West German body politic and in the official chambers of East German 
power became more pronounced in 1983 and 1984, when NATO and the USSR 
announced the placement of nuclear weapons in West and East Germany, respectively.  
The international political climate of détente had ended with the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 and the election of Ronald Reagan to the American presidency in 
1980.  Across Europe, a conservative realignment threatened to raise Cold War tensions.  
After the Soviet Union announced it would place medium-range SS-20 missiles in East 
Germany, NATO announced it would likewise place medium-range Pershing missiles on 
West German soil, prompting an outcry from an increasingly pacifist West German 
public.  The ultimate fate of Germany, should a nuclear war occur, was not lost on 
Honecker or Kohl.  It was politically expedient in Kohl’s case to oppose an international 
situation that might see the missiles used, but more importantly, it was necessary to the 
survival of Germany and its people.  The German public and its government realized that 
nuclear war would result in the annihilation of German civilization.  This concern was 
shared in the East and led the two leaders to seek improved ties. 
 A third reason for the improved relations was the increasing reliance of the East 
German economy on West German loans.  The East German economy, like the rest of the 
Soviet bloc, experienced economic stagnation in the 1980s and soon fell into financial 
turmoil.  Beginning in 1983, when Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauß arranged for one 
billion Deutschmarks in credits for the GDR, East Berlin became dependent on Western 
aid to stay afloat.  Continual Western loans, and the prices demanded by Bonn for its 
financial support, deepened the ties between the two Germanies.  For East Germany, it 
was a matter of necessity: the state could not afford to pay its workers, maintain its high 
level of defense spending, operate its extensive social services, and continue to provide 
the consumer goods that its citizens expected without West German credits.  For the 
West, the GDR’s woes presented what Bonn saw as a unique opportunity to inspire 
reform in its neighbor.  By demanding that Honecker liberalize travel restrictions, 
promote youth exchanges, and release political dissidents, the West German leadership 
believed that it could leverage the East’s economic problems into steps toward its inner-
German policy goals.  One such goal, increasing exit visa numbers for East Germans who 
wished to settle permanently in the West, saw marked improvement during this period; 
around 40,000 East Germans were allowed to emigrate to the West following the 1984 
credit extension22.  Additionally, Bonn sought direct contact through expansion of 
visitation permits to the West.  As Kohl noted in his memoirs, 
“Franz Josef Strauß vermittelte deshalb 1983 den Milliardenkredit für die 
DDR, und die Bundesregierung übernahm die Bürgschaft.  Unsere 
Rechnung ging auf: Kamen bis Anfang der achtziger Jahre neben den 
Rentnern jährlich nur einige zehntausend Besucher, konnten wir etwa 
1986 über eine halbe Million Menschen unterhalb des Rentenalters aus 
dem anderen Teil Deutschalnds zäheln.  Die Zahl stieg stetig an.” 23 
 
                                                
22 Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft (Stuttgart: 
Detusche Verlags-Anstalt), 179. 
23 Helmut Kohl, Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Ullstein Buchverlage, 1996),  
30.  Translation (mine):  “Franz Josef Strauß therefore procured in 1983 the million 
credits for the GDR, and the Federal Government took up the guarantee.  Our reasoning 
went: since the beginning of the 1980s, only around ten thousand [GDR] pensioners per 
year visited the FRG.  We could by 1986 show our side of Germany to more than half a 
million people, on top of the pensioners.  The number kept growing.”   
By 1987, the year of Honecker’s visit, more than five million East Germans were able to 
visit the Federal Republic; more than one million were youths.  “Das bedeutete, daß 
Millionen Deutsche aus der DDR die Bundesrepublik aus eigener Anschauung, aus 
eigener Erfahrung kennenlernten,” Kohl wrote24.  The practical effect of these visitations 
was that East and West Germany became less “foreign” to each other, though they of 
course remained two extremely different states. 
 Despite these differences, Honecker and Kohl were able to construct a 
meaningful, distinct détente in the middle of an increase in international hostility.  While 
it is easy to overestimate the ability of either leader to chart their own course within the 
confines of their alliance—Honecker, after all, eventually fell when he crossed too many 
lines with the Soviets—the accomplishments of the two governments and their leaders 
should not be ignored.  The Honecker-Besuch was a seminal moment in postwar German 
history and could have never occurred without the changes that began in 1972 and 
continued up until the sudden collapse of East Germany in 1989-90.  In 1987, no credible 
observer in West Germany believed that reunification was just around the corner.  
Instead, both governments sought practical achievements that would improve the lives of 
their citizens.  Their ability to do this in the face of rather stiff resistance from their 





                                                
24 Ibid.  Translation (mine): “That meant that millions of Germans could become familiar 
with the Federal Republic, our ideas, and our way of life.”  
Chapter One: Pershings, SS-20s, and the Peace Movements  
 On December 12, 1979, NATO foreign and defense ministers announced the 
placement of 108 Pershing II and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in 
Western Europe.  The move came in response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 
across the Warsaw Pact and increased anxiety over the growth of the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear arsenal.   The United States’ arsenal was the largest in the world during the early 
postwar period, but by the late 1970s, the Soviet Union had surpassed the US in the size 
of its nuclear stockpile.  In what became known as the “Dual-Track Decision,” NATO 
members agreed to modernize Western Europe’s missile arsenal while simultaneously 
supporting the removal of “one thousand US nuclear warheads…as soon as feasible1.”  In 
addition, the NATO ministers agreed that they would not deploy the new missiles if the 
Soviet Union agreed to remove their SS-20s from the Eastern bloc.  The agreement 
would replace the Pershing I missiles currently deployed in Western Europe and also 
emphasized a transition to shorter-range missiles2.  Despite NATO’s “dual-track” 
approach3, the announcement that all 108 Pershing IIs would be placed on West German 
soil prompted a major outcry in German society.  On November 22, 1983, deployment of 
the Pershings began after Chancellor Kohl’s government agreed to allow it, prompting 
major protests again. 
                                                
1 NATO, “Ministerial Communiqué: Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers, 
Brussels,” NATO (December 12, 1979), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c791212a.htm, (accessed October 14, 2009).  
2 Ibid. 
3 The term “dual-track” came from the parallel aims of the policy: modernizing and 
expanding NATO’s missile stocks in Western Europe while simultaneously making the 
offer to eliminate stocks if the Soviets would reciprocate. 
 Why did the Pershing IIs come up against such strong resistance in West 
Germany?  The Federal Republic had hosted missiles for years without provoking the 
reaction caused by the dual-track decision.  It was, rather, the nature of the Pershings that 
upset German peace activists.  The medium-range Pershings and SS-20s were designed to 
be operable in a shoot-on-warning scenario.  Since the missiles had such a short distance 
between their launch site and ultimate destination, they narrowed the window of 
opportunity to call off a planned nuclear strike.  Whereas the amount of time between an 
ICBM launch and impact could be measured in minutes, leaving time for a last-minute 
call to Moscow or Washington, the amount of time in which a Pershing or SS-20 launch 
would hit its target would be measured in the tens of seconds.  Once launched, it would 
be all but impossible to call off an attack.  As a result, the peace movement viewed the 
medium-range missiles as destabilizing and potentially damaging.  Furthermore, given 
their limited range, both the Pershings and SS-20s were aimed at missile defense systems, 
troop concentrations, economic targets, and transit systems on opposing sides of the Iron 
Curtain; while Germans could conceivably think a conflagration between the United 
States and Soviet Union might send ICBMs over their heads while sparing Germany, 
medium-range missiles would undoubtedly bring nuclear destruction to central Europe.  
In fact, the opposite seemed to be the case: the superpowers could now engage in a proxy 
nuclear war, with Germany as the main battleground.  Mutually-assured destruction was 
no longer a given.  “We ourselves felt endangered by the SS-20s,” admitted former 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, no strong supporter of the dual-track decision, in his memoirs4. 
                                                
4 Brandt 328 
 The pushback from the West German public was intense.  Anti-missile activists 
published the so-called “Krefeld Appeal” in 1980, urging the FRG’s government to reject 
NATO’s missile deployment.  Among other things, the Appeal sought to prevent 
Germany from becoming a “nuklearen Waffenplattform der USA5.”  It directly criticized 
what Krefeld’s authors saw as American disregard for the fate of Europe: 
“Ein selbstmörderischer Rüstungswettlauf könnte nicht im letzten 
Augenblick gestoppt werden; seine zunehmende Beschleunigung und 
offenbar konkreter werdende Vorstellungen von der scheinbaren 
Begrenzbarkeit eines Nuklearkrieges müßten in erster Linie die 
europäischen Völker einem untragbaren Risiko aussetzen6.” 
 
Krefeld began as the appeal of a rather academic elite but soon moved into a general 
protest of the West German public.  Some 2.7 million West Germans signed it, and in 
1983, former Chancellor Willy Brandt led a Bonn rally of 300,000 Germans in support of 
Krefeld7.  The opposition to the missiles plagued West German politicians, especially the 
center-left SPD, which was torn between its antimissile left and its more security-oriented 
center, although unease over the missiles was broad-based across the ideological 
spectrum of the West German public.  Helmut Schmidt faced challenges to his 
government’s missile policy twice in 1980.  The most serious was the Bielefeld Appeal 
of December 9, 1980, in which some 150 SPD officials asked Schmidt’s government to 
                                                
5 “Krefeld Appeal,” in Deutsche Volkszeitung (1981), http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1129, (accessed October 22, 2009). Translation 
(mine): “a nuclear weapons platform of the USA.” 
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reject the dual-track decision and the placement of neutron bombs in Germany8.  Echoing 
the Krefeld Appeal, members of Schmidt’s own party openly criticized his government, 
calling the 1979 missile resolution “eine verhängnisvolle Fehlentscheidung9” and saying 
that Schmidt’s actions had allowed “unsere Zukunft einer amerikanischen Entscheidung 
ausliefern, die beinhaltet, daß ein auf Europa begrenzter Atomkrieg führbar ist10.”  The 
SPD officials criticized Schmidt’s government, arguing that the SPD was “in den Sog der 
Politik eines Ronald Reagan gerät11.”  The Bielefeld Appeal and Krefeld Appeal were 
manifestations of the strong political unease that existed in the Social Democratic Party 
and among members of the West German public in general.  Ultimately, Schmidt would 
be unable to survive the tensions caused by the dual track decision and the FRG’s 
economic climate.  In 1982, a revolt by the SPD’s left over missile deployment paralyzed 
his government; Schmidt’s coalition subsequently fell apart as the FDP defected and 
joined Kohl’s CDU/CSU-led coalition.  The electoral split in the SPD’s ranks and public 
anger over the dual-track decision also created an opening for the Greens, who entered 
the Bundestag for the first time in 1983 after winning 5.6% of the West German vote. 
 Beyond its electoral implications, the peace movement had a profound effect on 
West German policymaking and political culture.  The German public had experienced 
sizeable mobilization against the interests of NATO and the US-led alliance.  Frustration 
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over the government’s dithering led to mass rallies, the largest since 1945.  “The 
strongest reservations [to the NATO plan] were found outside the political parties,” wrote 
Willy Brandt in his memoirs12.  In the end, wrote Foreign Minister Genscher, West 
Germany “had to accept the decision that the Pershing IIs…were deployed only in West 
Germany,” but both the government and many of its people worried about the 
implications; specifically that “once again, as West and East drifted apart, Germany 
would be hit the hardest13.” 
 The missile debate, then, took place in a heated environment in which the stakes 
seemed to be the future of German civilization itself.  The issues being debated directly 
affected the Germans in a very profound way given Germany’s central position in 
divided Europe, and the rhetoric of Krefeld and Bielefeld reflected that.  The missile 
debate prompted levels of unrest in Germany that had not been seen since the Weimar 
era.  Yet even as this heated debate raged, it also created an opening for détente between 
East and West.  Perhaps most importantly, the missile debate raised questions in the 
minds of many Germans as to the efficacy of their alliance system.  When Reagan 
carelessly discussed with Le Figaro the possibility of the US and Soviet Union surviving 
a limited nuclear war in Europe, Germans took note.  During the 1970s and 1980s the 
number of Germans who saw peaceful cooperation between East and West as possible 
increased, while consistent majorities supported the somewhat vague concept of 
détente14.   At the height of the missile crisis, nearly half of Germans saw Ronald Reagan 
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While the US’s poll numbers among Germans would eventually recover, the damage to 
West Germany’s relationship had been done.  As a result, even as the superpowers pulled 
apart, German support for détente remained strong. 
 Naturally, East German leaders initially welcomed the dissent in the West.  Their 
homegrown peace movements had yet to take off, and Moscow and East Berlin 
welcomed the dissent that the missile decision sowed within NATO.  “The peace 
movement is used by Moscow whether the movement wants it or not,” one Swedish 
official quipped in 198316.  East Germany, however, had more to lose from a nascent 
peace movement due to its monopolization of political expression surrounding ‘peace’ 
and its own image.  Since its foundation, East Germany had presented its rationale for 
existence as peace-oriented, among other ideological commitments.  Due to the state’s 
official emphasis on its peace credentials, East Germany could not tolerate an 
independent peace movement.  The rise of the East German peace movement could thus 
be considered the beginning of the end for the East German state.  It was the first 
persistent, mass challenge to the state’s authority to rise up in the Honecker years, and 
proved to be impossible for the state to destroy.  What Honecker and Gromyko had likely 
promoted in the West quickly became a stumbling block in the East, as opposition to the 
Warsaw Pact’s own missiles began to take hold in East Germany.  The Eastern 
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movement tended to oppose both NATO’s dual-track decision and the deployment of 
Warsaw Pact missiles.  As expelled peace activist Roland Jahn said, “Ich kenne 
niemanden in der DDR, der für den NATO-Raketenbeschluß ist, denn wenn ein Gewehr 
auf dich gerichtet ist, dann wirst du nicht dafür sein, daß es auf dich gerichtet ist. Und die 
Pershing II sind auf uns in der DDR gerichtet17.”  While the West German movement 
tended to focus on West German decisions, the Eastern movement was more universal, 
reflecting the political realities of the state.  West Germans could agitate for mass policy 
changes, but the Eastern dissidents had much dimmer prospects.  Their efforts were more 
often than not met by harsh reprisals and monitoring by the police and Stasi, and their 
activities were decidedly unwelcome amongst any portion of the political elite.   
The elites had reason to worry; the peace movement formed the nucleus of a new 
dissident core challenging the political establishment.   “As the peace movement in the 
GDR grew, it began asking hard questions about the situation at home,” challenging the 
government not only on its militarism but also on its human rights and economic 
record18. “Es steht nicht mehr nur die Frage nach Abrüstung da, sondern die nach 
demokratischen Freiheiten, nach Menschenrechten,” Jahl told Die Tageszeitung19.  The 
state was forced to crack down on these activists in the same way that it was forced to 
crack down on all non-official political agitation because they necessarily presented a 
threat to the government’s authority in the matter. “Much of the unrest was apolitical, but 
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any challenge to the status quo was implicitly a challenge to the ruling party20.”  
Moreover, the challenge presented by the peace movements was especially dangerous for 
East Germany because it was made in the very language of the state.  By opposing the 
government from the basis of its own stated policies, the East German peace movement 
undermined the basis of SED government.  East German concerns over the movement’s 
strength led them to monitor its leaders carefully and expel many of them, which helped 
to create links between the Eastern and Western movements.   As one expelled leader of 
the GDR’s nascent peace movement told Die Tageszeitung in 1983:  
“Da sehen wir eben die Widersprüche zwischen dem Militarismus im 
gesellschaftlichen Leben und dem offiziell bekundeten Friedenswillen. die 
staatlichen Stellen begreifen das so, daß sich aus dieser Bewegung dann 
was entwickeln könnte, was die ganzen gesellschaftlichen Strukturen 
infrage stellt21.” 
 
The East German population, despite living under a totalitarian state, had ample access to 
West German media and ideas by the 1980s, and consciousness of the nuclear question 
permeated society.  What made the East German peace movement so virulent, then, was 
its subversive nature, and the GDR’s security apparatus worked tirelessly to crush it.  
Nevertheless, despite the state’s harsh crackdown on activists, the movement persisted 
and gained considerable tacit, if not outright, support among the East German people.  
Part of the reason for this was that it operated primarily out of the churches, a feature 
repeated by the agitation of 1989.  The Lutheran presence in East Germany had been 
given freer reign than most other independent organizations, and the authorities were 
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reluctant to arrest or disrupt the churches’ activities.  As a result, they became the loci for 
dissent.  It is no coincidence that many of the leaders of the peace movement—
Eppelmann, Führer, Wonneberger—were pastors.  Some of the first mass peace events in 
East Germany were prayer meetings at their Leipzig churches22.  Officials frowned upon 
the churches—attendance could cost an East German their job or could lead to 
blacklisting23.  But the peace prayers persisted, eventually mixing in with other groups of 
dissidents and, crucially, East Germans attempting to leave the GDR.  The peace 
movement’s sometime uneasy embrace of would-be emigrants—many saw them as 
traitors to the cause of reform, while their neighbors often saw them as traitors to the 
country24—helped turn “peace” into a mass movement for reform. 
 In 1982, a young Berlin pastor named Reiner Eppelmann published what became 
known as the Berlin Appeal, calling for the demilitarization of East and West Germany 
and an end to the arms race that had taken hold in the 1980s.  Eppelmann argued from a 
distinctly religious perspective—he quoted the Sermon on the Mount and asked “sollten 
wir nicht lieber den Hungernden in aller Welt helfen, statt fortzufahren, unseren Tod 
vorzubereiten25”—but his appeal quickly gained mass circulation in the GDR.  In the 
West, this appeal would have been contentious enough—witness the reaction to the 
Krefeld and Bielefeld Appeals—but in the GDR it was even more so.  The pastor did not 
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explicitly call for the type of political reforms that the GDR could not tolerate, but did 
openly criticize the state.  In a 1982 interview with The Foreign Times’ Frank Lipsius, he 
remarked, "I believe that the government is sincere in its profession of peace, but like the 
United States or West Germany… what they do does not always promote peace26." 
Eppelmann was under intense scrutiny from the Stasi, which even proposed killing him in 
a staged car accident27, but was allowed to continue more or less unbothered, with the 
exception of a few short jailings.  “Eppelmann disclaim[ed] any revolutionary intentions 
other than helping his nation abide by its avowed commitment to peace28,” but his 
movement helped spark what would become the revolutionary peace movement. 
 This forced Erich Honecker and the East German government into a difficult 
position.  On one side, Berlin was pressed against a Soviet Union insistent on expanding 
the scope of nuclear missiles in East Germany and across the Eastern bloc.  By the time 
of the dual-track decision, East Germany was peppered with Soviet missile installations 
and hosted a vast arsenal of Soviet weapons and troops, not to mention East Germany’s 
considerable own military forces.  Despite its pacifist rhetoric, the GDR, like the FRG, 
was armed to the teeth.  Furthermore, Honecker was in a weak position to challenge the 
Soviet leadership.  He had taken power after the failure of his predecessor, Walter 
Ulbricht, to consistently heed Moscow’s line and was seen as an intensely loyal, friendly 
ally in the Kremlin.  The missile crisis presented a unique problem, though: as public 
perception of the risk of nuclear war grew, so did public unease over the disparity in the 
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GDR’s stated purpose and its militaristic reality.  While Honecker did not wish to anger 
the Soviet leadership, he was increasingly put against the wall by a peace movement his 
government somehow could not stamp down and by the reality of what a nuclear war 
would mean for Germany.  For years, the Politburo’s rhetoric and the official releases of 
the state continued to announce their commitment to peace while simultaneously hosting 
close to one million Soviet troops and thousands of nuclear missiles.  Suddenly, 
Honecker faced pressure from the peace movement to back up the state’s rhetoric with 
action. 
Moreover, the deteriorating international climate in Europe frightened the SED 
leadership.  The reality of what a nuclear war would mean for Germany, especially now 
that medium-range missiles were stationed on German soil, coupled with the missiles’ 
effects at reducing the perception of mutually-assured destruction (the superpowers could 
conceivably now fight a proxy nuclear war), forced the SED to reevaluate its policies.  
On November 25, 1983, shortly after the Soviet Union forced Honecker to place SS20s 
and cruise missiles in the GDR, Honecker told the Central Committee of the SED that the 
placing of additional missiles would be an “ernsthafter Schaden” to European peace and 
for the FRG-GDR treaty system29.  While he acknowledged the need for a response to the 
NATO deployments, Honecker also stated that the missile deployment was “no great 
cause for jubilation in our country30.” Moscow’s directive, three days later, that West 
Germany should essentially pay for its decision to host NATO weapons through 
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worsened relations with East Germany—in essence, forcing the East to bear the brunt of 
the practical consequences of Moscow’s anger over NATO’s decision—did little to allay 
Honecker’s fears of a new freeze in European relations31.  His allegiance to Moscow 
began to waver, as he increasingly felt isolated by the Kremlin.  In the months following 
the missile deployment, GDR leadership would draft a unique security plan for the 
country32. 
 In both East and West, the direct implications of the peace movement were more 
limited than their romantic aspirations.  While hundreds of thousands of people protested 
in Bonn, their actions failed to produce a radical change in the Federal Republic’s policy.  
The pressure splintered the center-left SPD and helped to implode the government of 
Helmut Schmidt, but the the conservative CDU/CSU won nearly fifty percent of the 
popular vote and seats in the Bundestag in the 1983 elections, despite the widespread 
opposition to Pershings.  The newly-elected Kohl government quickly approved the 
missiles, which were deployed in West Germany beginning in 1983.  In the East, results 
were even more limited.  For much of the 1980s, the peace movement was an isolated, 
contained movement, the province of a few disaffected pastors and citizens.  It was not 
until later in the 1980s that it gained the prominence that led toward 1989, and despite the 
Berlin Appeal and other documents, the movement failed to gain much tangible support 
from an East German public too afraid or politically removed to take part.  By the mid-
1980s, the peace meetings in Leipzig churches were attended by fewer than ten people—
“they could hardly have been called a movement, much less a threat33.” 
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 Yet despite its limited impact in delivering immediate political change, the peace 
movement helped pave the way for the closer German cooperation of 1982-1987.  It 
proved that large portions of the population, if not outright sizeable majorities, supported 
détente even in the face of growing tension between the rival superpowers.  The 
movements raised consciousness of the threat of nuclear war both in German society and 
in the governments of the respective states and transformed pacifism into a relevant 
political issue.  Governments could no longer ignore the discontent and worry that the 
increasingly potent missile system provoked.  While a conservative government in the 
West meant that missiles would now be a reality, many of the CDU’s voters expressed 
concern that the gains of Ostpolitik not be forsaken by the Kohl administration.  In the 
East, the growing movement led the SED leadership to become more concerned with 
announcing its peaceful intentions and forced it to reevaluate its commitment to the goal 
of disarmament and cooperation.  Additionally, the movement in the West saturated the 
media of the FRG, which was widely available in the East by the 1980s.  Although 
contraband, East German authorities could not, and did not have the appetite to, stop the 
free flow of Western ideas through the television sets and radios of the German 
Democratic Republic.  The Eastern peace movement, despite being completely cut off 
from the West, thus benefitted immensely from its counterparts in the Federal Republic.  
Without the media attention their actions generated, it would likely have been impossible 
for the movement to gain footing.  Many of the famous agitations of the East, such as the 
Berlin Appeal, first spread through the Western media, helping to fan the Eastern peace 
movement when it was on life support.  Additionally, the presence of a strong peace 
movement in the West allowed the Eastern movements to deny that they were acting in 
collusion with a foreign plot to undermine the state.  Finally, the peace movements 
created a shared bond in the two Germanies.  The national unity that Kohl was so fond of 
talking about was ironically expressed in a peace movement with which he had little 
connection.  East Germany’s habit of expelling its most troubling activists created an 
opportunity for cooperation between the Western and Eastern movements, and the 
Western media was only too happy to assist this process.  Mass media had made the 
border too porous to simply expel its dissidents because their voices were paradoxically 
much louder on the other side of the border.  The peace movement was impossible to 















Chapter Two:  The Coalition of Reason 
 The peace movements of the 1980s and the extraordinary pressure they came to 
apply on the governments of the two Germanies were remarkable on their own accord.  
They would not, however, have been enough to force a continued and increased détente 
between East and West Germany if the leaders of the two states were fundamentally 
opposed to such a progression in their relations.  The peace movement in the West, while 
powerful, had failed to prevent the implementation of new missiles on German soil.  In 
the East, the peace movement was constrained by the nature of East German state 
repression; it occupied an officially unsanctioned position in GDR society and was thus 
forced to operate on the margins.  Leaders and activists were the subjects of intense state 
scrutiny and faced social and political pressure that kept all but the most dedicated from 
being seriously active in the movement until the upheaval of 1989.  While the movement 
was certainly powerful, it seemed, at least in 1982, to be approaching a brick wall in the 
form of two opposing governments in Bonn and Berlin.  Yet this barrier never 
materialized.  To the contrary, Kohl and Honecker were able to overcome their 
differences based on a shared understanding of Germany’s need for progress on inter-
state relations. 
 In 1982, the FDP abandoned Helmut Schmidt’s SDP/FDP coalition, ending his  
eight-year government and thirteen years of SPD rule.  Their defection allowed Helmut 
Kohl’s CDU/FDP coalition to assume power; Kohl promptly called a snap election.  
Despite the SPD’s attempt to make the double-track decision and international peace the 
most important issue of the election, Kohl’s CDU/CSU won the party’s largest share—
48.7%, plus 6.9% for the FDP—since Adenauer’s 1957 electoral victory.  The SPD 
slumped to 38.2%, their worst result since 19611.  The new government’s policies were 
the subject of public and private speculation: the last CDU politician to rule Germany had 
been Kurt Kiesinger (1966-69), who had established diplomatic ties with Romania and 
Yugoslavia but had also reaffirmed the Federal Republic’s commitment to the Hallstein 
Doctrine.  In Helmut Kohl, Germans had elected a man far removed from Kiesinger, but 
one who had also pledged to move away from the policies of Brandt and Schmidt.  Franz 
Josef Strauß, leader of the CSU, criticized Brandt’s détente-oriented policies as “wrong-
headed” and “destroying all sense of values.”  Missiles, he argued, would be used for 
“responsible pacifism;” an insurance against the Soviet “war against the freedom of 
Europeans2.”  Strauß’ speech took a hard line against the USSR, arguing that the West 
had never initiated conflict.   
 For its part, the SED reacted to the news of Kohl’s election with reservation.  The 
Party’s newspaper, Neues Deutschland, ran a single sentence on its front page about 
Honecker’s telegram to Kohl congratulating him on becoming FRG Chancellor.  
Nevertheless, external observers noted that the GDR’s leadership could not help but be 
displeased with the result.  “The sparseness of official editorializing has not obscured the 
SED’s major reservations about the new ruling coalition and the consequences that the 
change in government might have for relations between the two German states,” noted 
Radio Free Europe’s Ronald Asmus on October 10, 1982, six days after Kohl was voted 
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into office3.  The East Germans feared that a return to CDU rule would mark the end of 
the productive period of inter-German relations that had existed from 1969-82.  
Specifically, they were “oversensitive on the question of recognition” and feared that the 
GDR “might again be treated like a second-class state4.”  The East Germans’ unease was 
somewhat allayed by the continued presence of Genscher as Foreign Minister, but 
nevertheless feared the uncertainty of a new government. 
 Kohl’s opening address to the Bundestag on October 13, 1982 focused mostly on 
economic issues.  Of the four points of Kohl’s Dringlichkeitsprogramm5, only the fourth 
dealt with East Germany6: “Wir wollen die Grundlagen der deutschen Außen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik erneuern7.”  He did, however, reaffirm his support for NATO’s dual-
track decision, which predictably angered the East.  The reaction from Neues 
Deutschland and leaders of the East German state was swift.  Honecker himself blasted 
what he termed Kohl’s “dangerous dreams” of a united Germany, while Paul Verner, CC 
Secretary for Security Affairs, told the CDU-Ost conference in Dresden that progress in 
inter-German relations would be in effect contingent on the FRG’s rejection of the 
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missiles8.  Western observers tended to view the Eastern response as puzzling; in the 
West, Kohl’s speech “was largely interpreted as a confirmation of the broad contours of 
West German foreign policy…heralding…no major departures in direction9.”  The East 
Germans, however, clearly had limited expectations for Ostpolitik’s ability to survive a 
CDU government. 
 October 1982, then, appeared to signal an end to the thaw of 1969-82.  The cards 
seemed stacked against continued rapprochement in every way.  The ascension of the 
CDU into power meant that a party whose views were anathema to the East now 
governed West Germany.  While official East German propaganda considered all of the 
Western Volksparteien bourgeois, decadent remnants of the Third Reich, the SPD had at 
least represented a center-left perspective, one the SED could more easily work with.  
The CDU, on the other hand, was a party whose leaders had once been portrayed in 
official GDR media as standing on the pedestal of Hitler.  For the CDU, the SED 
represented the continued oppression of the “other half” of Germany.  Despite Kohl and 
the CDU’s policy change during the late 1970s and early 1980s—they now openly 
supported the Basic Treaty and other major foreign policy landmarks of the early to mid 
1970s, and had dropped the untenable Hallstein Doctrine—they still insisted on the 
overall unity of the German people.   Furthermore, the leaders themselves were 
personally very opposed to their counterparts’ programs.  Neither Kohl nor Honecker was 
prepared to make significant concessions to the other in order to promote some sense of 
German unity. 
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 Yet these differences did not lead to a cooling of German-German relations.  On 
the contrary, German relations improved during the 1980s to the point that Kohl was 
forced to fend off accusations of impending neutrality in NATO.  Stemming from a 
mutual desire to see Germany chart a different course in the rapidly heating Cold War of 
the mid-1980s, Kohl and Honecker were able to overcome their differences to make 
genuine progress in several areas of East-West German relations.  The policy 
developments of the mid-1980s were specific in nature, relating to cultural and family 
exchanges and financial support for the East German regime.  But beyond this, the two 
leaders engaged in personal conversation over the period of Kohl’s chancellorship, 
leading up to the events of 1989.  Although realistic, the two leaders nevertheless 
affirmed privately what they proclaimed publicly—that they were indeed committed to a 
special relationship between the two German states so that war might “never again 
emanate” from Germany10.  While these public statements affirmed general values, Kohl 
and Honecker’s conversations indicate a deeper understanding of the significance of their 
respective positions in securing not only German but also wider peace.  On January 24, 
1983, shortly after Kohl took office, the two leaders spoke by telephone on a wide range 
of issues.  The call lasted nearly thirty minutes; the two leaders spoke about serious issues 
facing their two countries’ relations, as well as made small talk about the unseasonably 
warm weather.  Immediately after the beginning of the conversation, Kohl stated: 
“Wir beide in besonderem Maße auch erantwortung für die Sicherung des 
Friedens in Europa tragen.  Und es ist unser Wunsch, auch unter diesen 
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Kohl’s opening statement immediately set a tone of cooperation and echoed his call for 
the two states to “renew the foundations” their foreign policy, made in front of the 
Bundestag two months earlier12.  He framed the relationship with Honecker in terms of 
Germany’s responsibility to sustain peace, not only for its own people, but for Europe 
and the wider world.  Honecker echoed his call, saying, “ich [bin] im gleichen Maße der 
Auffassung13.”  Kohl was somewhat less forceful in his stated opinions; speaking mostly 
in generalities at the outset.  He quickly stated a desire for “das Verhältnis zwischen den 
beiden deutschen Staaten vernünftig und wenn möglich gut zu gestalten” and expressed 
his excitement over the possibility of speaking14.  Honecker, while agreeing with these 
statements in principle, bent less, saying that any improvement would need to be made 
within the existing treaty system15.  Honecker refused to budge on one issue in particular: 
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12 Helmut Kohl, “Koalition der Mitte: Für eine Politik der Erneuerung.”  
13 Erich Honecker, “Gespräch zwischen Genossen Erich Honecker und dem 
Bundeskanzler der BRD, Helmut Kohl, am 24. Januar 1983 von 10.33 Uhr bis 11.00 
Uhr,” in Die Koalition der Vernunft, ed. Heinrich Potthoff (Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), 102. Translation (mine): “I am of the same majority of 
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14 Helmut Kohl, “Gespräch zwischen Genossen Erich Honecker und dem Bundeskanzler 
der BRD, Helmut Kohl, am 24. Januar 1983 von 10.33 Uhr bis 11.00 Uhr,” in Die 
Koalition der Vernunft, ed. Heinrich Potthoff (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
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15 Erich Honecker, “Gespräch zwischen Genossen Erich Honecker und dem 
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Beziehungen zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik 
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the question of GDR sovereignty.  The development of improved relations, in his view, 
was only possible “wenn von beiden Seiten beachtet wird, daß es sich hier um 
Beziehungen von zwei souveränen Staaten handelt16.”  Surprisingly, Kohl did not object; 
while he did not explicitly say anything in agreement with Honecker’s desire, he also did 
not attack it, offering instead a simple “yes.”  When Honecker raised the issue again, 
Kohl again failed to challenge the East German leader, even when the GDR Secretary 
stated that “ein solches Deutschland gibt es ja gar nicht17” in response to Kohl’s “both 
states in Germany” rhetoric.  This was one of the most explosive issues in FRG-GDR 
relations, one with which Kohl had publicly disagreed and one which Honecker had spent 
the greater portion of his political career attempting to overcome.  While it could be said 
that Kohl was willing to treat relations with the GDR as he would with any sovereign 
state, but not prepared to actually admit to such a deal, his failure to reject Honecker’s 
statement should be seen as a fundamental change in the construction of East-West 
relations.  Kohl did not completely bow to Honecker’s demands; the East German leader 
expressed his irritation at Kohl’s referral to “both states in Germany” in the January 23, 
1983 telephone conversation, but Kohl continued to use the phrase in an October, 1983 
letter18.  Nevertheless, Kohl’s failure to challenge Honecker’s rhetoric in their 
conversation indicates that he had conceded the basic nature of two German states’ 
independent sovereignty.  Whether or not Kohl had privately accepted Honecker’s claim, 
                                                                                                                                            
interested in the continued development of relations between the GDR and the FRG in 
the established treaty system.” 
16 Ibid. Translation (mine): “From my view, the development of relations between the 
GDR and FRG is possible if both sides are paid attention to, that it is handled as relations 
between two sovereign states.”   
17 Ibid, 107. Translation (mine): “There is no such Germany.” 
18 Helmut Kohl, “Brief von Helmut Kohl zu Erich Honecker, October 24, 1983, in  
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, October 24, 1983. 
their conversation suggests that he was willing to, for all practical purposes, treat the East 
as a sovereign entity. 
It was a major breakthrough, and signified a huge pivot in West German 
conservative thinking.  While outwardly maintaining the ultimate goal of German 
reunification, privately, Kohl had bowed to reality—German unification was extremely 
unlikely to occur within his lifetime, if at all.  Given this likelihood, the best West 
Germany could hope for was to loosen Eastern restrictions on cultural exchange and 
visitation and work with the East on issues whenever possible.  For his part, Honecker 
was willing to compromise somewhat with the FRG, although he tended to drive a harder 
bargain than the West.  For one, the GDR had less to offer: economically, it was 
increasingly dependent on Western aid.  Additionally, Honecker was wary of pressure 
from Moscow; the caution with which he dealt with the Soviet Union was one of the 
hallmarks and near constants of his regime.  The General Secretary had taken power in 
1970 after a Soviet-engineered coup of Ulbricht, who had been at odds with Brezhnev.  
Upon taking office, Honecker was immediately warned by Brezhnev to “never forget that 
the GDR cannot exist without…the Soviet Union19.”  The words stayed with him; 
Honecker was unswervingly loyal to the USSR until the Gorbachev era.  Nevertheless, 
the East German leader was willing to work with Kohl on issues of shared importance 
and would accept exchanges and visitation permits for desperately needed credits.  The 
two leaders agreed that their countries and systems were extremely different and that 
major reform to each state’s domestic and political structure was off the table.  Yet they 
accepted a mutual responsibility to work on issues of shared importance for the East and 
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West German nations—disarmament, cultural exchange, improved day-to-day relations, 
and commerce—whenever consent could be found.  In short, they took a pragmatic 
course to the question of German division; they chose, when possible, sober reason over 
ideological divide.  Against the odds, they became known as the “Coalition of Reason,20” 
so named after a 1983 Honecker speech in which the East German leader called for world 
leaders to form such a group21. 
After Kohl accepted Honecker’s initial test in the conversation, that his German 
Democratic Republic be treated as a sovereign state, Honecker quickly moved on to an 
issue of mutual concern: the nuclear question.  Here, Honecker offered a significant olive 
branch, stating that “wir [sind] am Zeitpunkt angelangt, in dem man sagen kann, daß 
mehr Rüstung keinesfalls mehr Sicherheit bedeutet22.”  Armaments, Honecker said, 
would not secure a brighter future for Germany.  It was a shocking statement for the 
leader of East Germany to make.  His state fielded the Warsaw Pact’s most advanced 
military after the Soviet Union’s23; the RAND Corporation estimated East German 
military spending to be around 6-7% of GDP in 198424.  This figure was the highest 
among non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members and had increased continuously since 197125.  
Military strength was a foundation of East German foreign policy and was in many ways 
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the basis of the state’s continued quest for international legitimacy, especially in regards 
to Soviet respect for GDR positions.  East Germany attempted “to translate its military 
strength into greater autonomy” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union26; in many ways, armaments 
were crucial in supporting the GDR’s attempts to develop greater autonomy in its internal 
and external policy.  Honecker’s statement was thus remarkable, especially given that it 
was made directly to Kohl.  But in the context of Honecker and the SED’s changing 
position on nuclear weapons, however, it was a reasonable statement.  Honecker was not 
saying that the East German military did not afford security; the statement instead grew 
out of his increasingly open opposition to the placement of nuclear weapons—a position 
that increasingly put him out-of-step with Moscow. 
This isolation, as stated in the previous chapter, forced the East German leadership to 
reevaluate their foreign policy and was a leading reason behind Honecker’s willingness to 
cooperate with Kohl.  What occurred in the GDR in the early 1980s was not a 
revolution—Honecker and the SED leadership remained loyal to Moscow on almost all 
issues, and their disobedience on the missiles issue was limited to verbal disagreement 
(albeit public and vociferous).  Nevertheless, Erich Honecker’s mindset had changed.  
For the first time, he saw the Kremlin as acting in its own interests in a way that clearly 
endangered the Germans.  The distrust that formed on his part, and was expressed 
through SED policy, would continue until the end of Honecker’s government in 1989; the 
East German General Secretary would eventually emerge as a leading critic of 
Gorbachev’s liberalizations in the late 1980s.  With Soviet policy now in question, the 
GDR’s upper echelon was able to shift its perception from a purely ideological battle 
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between the imperialist West and socialism to what Gerald Segal called “a common, all-
human interest in preventing nuclear war which transcended class interest27.”  Though 
Segal tends to exaggerate the cooperation between the two states, it is a fundamentally 
correct assertion.  Honecker did not suddenly see the FRG as a friend—but he did see the 
West as an ally for advancing his desire for détente in Europe.  As a result, he was willing 
to make extraordinary offers in his personal correspondence and conversation with Kohl.  
Honecker’s desire to reach agreement on the nuclear question was the overriding concern 
in his correspondence with Kohl in the early to mid-1980s.  In an October 5, 1983 letter, 
the General Secretary wrote that “ist es meine Auffassung, daß sich alle, die das 
Abgleiten der Menschheit in eine nukleare Katastrophe verhindern wollen, zu einer 
Koalition der Vernunft zusammentun sollten28.”  He asked Kohl to reconsider his 
position on the stationing of NATO missiles in the FRG, although this was backed up by 
what Honecker termed Andropov’s “encouragement” to keep the military balance as it 
was29.  He blamed the United States’ inflexibility on the issue of nuclear dearmament 
(Kohl, naturally, would take the opposite view in his response) for the failure of the 1983 
Geneva talks between the Soviet Union and the US, and criticized NATO for being more 
interested in increasing its armaments than negotiating30.  Nevertheless, it was a 
surprisingly blunt call for negotiation.  Honecker concluded by stating, “[ich] erkläre die 
uneingeschränkte Bereitschaft der DDR, jeden Schritt zu unterstützen…die uns einem 
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gesicherten Frieden näherbringen31,.” to The letter was published in Neues Deutschland, 
the GDR’s state newspaper and signed in the name of the German people. 
For his part, Chancellor Kohl seemed somewhat more reticent than Honecker to 
agree to significant effort toward arms control.  In their January 23, 1983 phone 
conversation, he stated that “wir wollen militärisch bedeutsame, ausgewogene, 
überprüfbare Vereinbarungen zur Rüstungskontrolle und zur Abrüstung32,” but did not 
offer any specific methods by which he would accomplish that, nor offer a commitment 
to large-scale, specific action.  Kohl viewed the missile question, at least in his 
conversation with Honecker, as something beyond his control; he agreed to talk to the 
Americans about reaching an agreement with Andropov, but offered little assurance that 
such an approach would net results.  According to the chancellor, his hands were tied; 
instead, it would be up to Reagan and Andropov, although he stated his hope that the two 
speak rationally and not resort to “Propagandatricks33.”  It seems apparent that Kohl was 
at first less committed than Honecker to the idea of disarmament.  He was irritated by the 
Soviet placement of SS20s and felt that the placement of NATO missiles in the FRG was 
justified, if undesirable.  “Das Gleichgewicht ist heute gestört,” Kohl wrote, because of 
the Soviet Union’s missile placements34.  Under his government, West Germany would 
not become “ein[e] Zone minderer Sicherheit mit allen politischen und strategischen 
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Konsequenzen der Instabilität35.”  Instead, Kohl asked Honecker to use his influence to 
block any new missiles in the GDR and work to eliminate those already placed36.  For 
Kohl, the deployment of missiles was worrying but necessary, a practical Western 
response to Soviet military expansion.  The deployment of the Pershing and cruise 
missiles on West German soil had cost Kohl valuable political capital, and the chancellor 
was not prepared to walk that back, especially in the nascent period of his chancellorship.   
Furthermore, he was approaching the problem from an unbalanced position.  Though 
Kohl was disturbed by the prospect of an all-out nuclear conflagration in central Europe, 
the reality on the ground was that his side was placed in what he, and NATO, viewed as a 
tactical disadvantage.  Since the Soviet Union had already placed its upgraded short and 
medium-range tactical nuclear missiles in the GDR, Kohl felt that he had no choice.  His 
letters and conversations with Honecker repeatedly emphasized that he would not accept 
a situation in which West Germany was at a strategic disadvantage in regards to the 
Soviet bloc.  Whether NATO actually was at a disadvantage is debatable; it was a classic 
security dilemma.  Regardless, Kohl viewed his state as less secure than it had been 
before the East received SS20s, and he would not accept any situation in which they 
remained.  Hence his request that Honecker take the impetus for peace, either by 
removing his missiles or pressuring the USSR to do it37.  Both were unrealistic, and so 
Kohl was direct about his intention to bolster his state’s security.  “Es [ist] unrealistisch 
zu glauben, daß eine Seite bereit sein könnte, ihre Sicherheitsinteressen als Presi für die 
                                                
35 Ibid. Translation (mine): “a zone of lower security with all of the political and strategic 
consequences of instability.”   
36 Helmut Kohl, “Brief von Helmut Kohl zu Erich Honecker, October 24, 1983.”   
37 He requested this in both his October 24 and December 14, 1983 letters to Honecker, 
as well as in his December 19, 1983 telephone conversation with the East German leader. 
Bereitschaft der anderen Seite zu guten politischen Beziehungen zu opfern38,” he wrote in 
his December 1983 letter.  With this in mind, he essentially took the issue of immediate 
nuclear disarmament off the table until the superpowers had resolved their disagreements 
at Geneva.  In a December 19, 1983 telephone conversation, he told Honecker bluntly 
that “Ich will auch jetzt nicht eine Würdigung…was die Stationierung betrifft, 
vornehmen.  Hier sind unsere Meinungen völlig verschieden39.”  It would be up to the 
superpowers, whom the chancellor hoped would to come to an understanding40.  Later, 
Kohl’s missile policy was far more active.  In 1988 he was praised by Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze for his decision to remove Germany’s Pershing missiles 
during the negotiations for 1987’s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, a 
decision which was not supported by many CDU backbenchers41.  Kohl’s shift to 
“decidedly more dovish positions on military policy42,” including his 1989 opposition to 
upgrades to NATO missiles in the FRG, would cause a serious strain in European 
politics43.  But at the time of NATO’s dual-track decision, Kohl was unwilling to make a 
major concession on missile deployment.  The chancellor believed that instead of 
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working to reduce each others’ stockpiles (especially through asking each other to first 
take the lead), it would be most beneficial for the two states to first act as a model for 
détente, keeping contact open in an increasingly hostile European environment.  
Secondly, the states should to work to convince the superpowers to reach an accord that 
included fewer missiles.  With the first goal in mind, the two states should focus on what 
they could do in isolation from the international situation; namely, improving the 
relations of the East and West German peoples through practical, concrete measures: 
increasing visitation, resolving trade issues, and promoting détente in popular terms: “die 
Menschen [sind die] echte Maßnahme der Friedenspolitik44.” 
Family visitation was a key issue for the West German leadership; according to 
some, it was “the top operative priority of the Bonn government’s policy toward the 
GDR45.”  For Kohl, restoring the familial ties of relatives separated by the Iron Curtain 
was critical to maintain some semblance of a German identity, an idea which he clung 
strongly to.  Beyond that, it was a popular and natural policy for the state.  The postwar 
division of Germany and tightening restrictions in the East (culminating with the 
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961) had led to the separation of families, relatives, 
and friends in the two Germanies.  Before the thaw of the early 1970s, communication 
between these separated persons was in most cases all but impossible46.  Nowhere was 
this more acute than in Berlin.  After the construction of the Wall, there was no travel in 
either direction except by those willing to attempt an escape.  As a result, “your brother 
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three blocks up the Friedrichstrasse might just have well have been in Outer Mongolia47.”  
This began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as improving relations brought 
easier travel across what had been for all but a handful an impenetrable barrier.  From a 
starting point of zero in 1970, casual telephone calls between West and East Berlin 
increased to “more than ten million” by 198848.  That same year, more than 1.5 million 
traveled from West Berlin to East Germany49.  Similarly, travel between West Germany 
and West Berlin by land became commonplace between 1970 and the late 1980s; while 
air travel made up roughly forty percent of the twelve million or so FRG-West Berlin 
travel arrangements in 1970 (travel by land was inconvenient and subject to difficulties 
with East German authorities), by 1986 some eighty-six percent of the 28 million trips 
were done by car50. 
Improvements in the ability of FRG citizens to visit the GDR, and vice versa, 
were both the result of better relations between the two states and the result of continuous 
pressing by the Bonn government.  In his first telephone conversation with Honecker, 
Kohl stated that the visitation question was “ein ganz zentraler Punkt für mich51,” and 
stated his support for the expansion of such visits.  Indeed, successive Western 
governments, including Kohl’s, were willing to make financial and political 
commitments to facilitate easier travel between the two states.  West German 
Deutschmarks went east to improve roads, railways, and other connections, and FRG 
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loans were often tied to liberalization of East German travel restrictions.  The 1983 
billion-mark loan to the GDR was explicitly described in such terms by FRG Minister of 
State Philipp Jenninger: “this was not a business transaction in the usual sense…it was an 
incentive to bring movement into intra-German relations on a broad basis52.”  In return 
for the loan, East Berlin agreed to specific measures to loosen travel restricitions, 
including reduction of minimum-exchange requirements, extension of maximum length 
of stay, and opening of more border-crossings between the two countries53.  The result 
was a steady increase in cross-border exchanges throughout the 1980s.  Visitation was 
not without seemingly intractable issues: the minimum-exchange quantity, for example, 
would remain salient throughout the Kohl-Honecker era.  The GDR sought to keep the 
minimum quantity high, as it encouraged Westerners to spend money in the East 
(officially, the East German Mark was pegged to the Deutschmark, requiring a 
conversion of one-to-one, far above its black market rate).  Additionally, the policy made 
travel to the East more inconvenient and thus had the side effect of discouraging visits.  
Keeping the restrictions in place also allowed East Berlin to keep monetary issues in a 
prime spot in FRG policy-making; the GDR government was angered by Western 
speculation on the Mark and the permanent weakness of the Ostmark to the Deutschmark.  
Honecker sought parity for the East German mark in trade between the two states: “für 
uns ist die Mark im Verkehr zwischen der DDR und der BRD eine Mark54.”  The ability 
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of West German visitors to exchange Deutschmarks for East German Marks at a rate of 
four or five DM to one DDR-Mark undermined this goal and also reflected unfavorably 
on the GDR’s economic position relative to the FRG.  It was also a direct violation of the 
GDR’s stated laws, which established a direct parity between the DDR-Mark and the 
Deutschmark—one that often existed only on paper.  Nevertheless, Honecker’s 
government was willing to liberalize travel policy to a reasonable extent.  As stated, such 
liberalizations were profitable for the GDR, and the SED leadership saw it as a practical 
step that could be taken to improve relations.  In his April, 1983 conversation with Kohl, 
Honecker agreed that his government would work diligently and was resolved to improve 
opportunities for cross-border interaction, and offered evidence of this, in that visits to 
West Berlin had doubled in the past year55.  While numbers of Westerners visiting the 
East grew by a huge rate during the 1970s and 1980s, liberalization in Eastern policy 
allowed growth in the numbers of Easterners going west.  The number of GDR visitors to 
the West grew from a handful in the early 1980s—Kohl wrote that around ten thousand 
people per year, mostly pensioners, were able to obtain travel visas from the East—to 
more than half a million visitors yearly by the beginning 198756.  1987 was a 
breakthrough year in visitations; raw numbers increased by a huge number and, for the 
first time, these numbers were made up by large groups of young people—previously, 
GDR citizens traveling west had been overwhelmingly elderly57.  In 1987 and 1988, more 
than 1.2 million East Germans visited the West, meaning that “one in every six East 
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Germans under pensionable age was able to travel to West Germany58;” including 
pensioners, more than six million East Germans—over a third of the total population—
visited the West in 198859.  Given the special nature of the German division, it was only 
natural that common agreements could be made on visitation, travel, and improving 
communication between families. 
Beyond visitation, the idea of reasonable improvements in German-German 
relations led to modest action on a host of smaller issues.  Town twinning, youth and 
cultural exchanges, and other gestures of goodwill became commonplace in the 1980s.  
Far from the freeze in German relations expected by the advent of the Kohl government, 
by the late 1980s inter-German relations were better than they had ever been in the 
postwar period.  While major breakthroughs on key issues like weapons reduction 
remained out-of-reach, the overall climate of improving relations created an environment 
in which such breakthroughs did not seem unreasonable.  More importantly, the inter-
German détente which flourished in the 1980s helped to defuse the tense international 
environment of the time.  Honecker and Kohl were able to look beyond their 
irreconcilable differences to make progress on those issues where mutual agreement 
existed, and by doing so they made significant and lasting progress in German-German 
relations.  Despite the limitations on what they could do and their states’ second-chair 
positions vis-à-vis the superpowers, their coalition of reason created marked, steady 
improvements in the German situation throughout the 1980s, culminating in Honecker’s 
visit to Bonn in 1987.  It was a seminal moment, one that would have seemed impossible 
two decades earlier.  It was the triumph of reason and responsibility over ideology in the 
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basic functioning of German-German relations, the accumulation of small steps toward 
normalization, that created an environment in which this could occur.  And though the 
two states, and their citizens, did not see a change in the basic situation of the German 
question in the near future, the efforts of Kohl, Honecker, and their governments 
continued the policies of Ostpolitik that enabled German relations to reach their best level 


















Chapter Three:  The Deutschmark Détente 
 East-West relations made significant strides in improving relations between the 
GDR and FRG during the 1980s.  Nevertheless, as the previous chapter shows, it is 
important to remember that the two states were members of opposing alliances, with 
incompatible political and economic systems.  These divisions were neither trifling nor 
easy to surmount, and the amount of agreement that could be made in spite of them was 
always limited.  Certainly, there was room for improvement, but rational observers and 
policy-makers on both sides never intended the continuing and escalating thaw of the 
1980s to lead toward political or economic union.  Inter-German efforts to improve 
political dialogue and peace politics were indeed substantial, but the two states’ relations 
with the superpowers heavily influenced them.  Trade between the two states had in 
many ways initiated détente in the 1970s; agreements on trade issues were the first to be 
established between the GDR and the FRG1.  Beginning in the 1970s and continuing 
through the 1980s, the West German economy became increasingly tied into those of the 
GDR and of the Soviet Union, and vice versa.  During the immediate postwar years, the 
Western powers frequently used inter-German trade as a political lever to isolate the East.  
A NATO embargo, for instance, in the early 1950s reduced East European countries’ 
share in West German foreign trade to just three percent, with the GDR accounting for 
only a small portion of that number2.   These policies, however, were never logical nor 
sustainable for the West.  As a growing economic power in the center of Europe, lying on 
the edge of the two blocs, the FRG would naturally benefit from an increase in trade.  
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Likewise, the GDR sat in the similar position on its side of the bloc, poised to gain 
immensely from thawed relations between itself and West Germany and between the 
larger blocs.  Trade was thus bound to increase.  Between 1952 and 1960 trade between 
the FRG and the Eastern bloc rose from 400 million Deutschmarks to 2.1 billion; by 1970 
it had increased to DM 5 billion, and by 1980 trade with the Eastern bloc, excluding the 
GDR, reached twenty billion Deutschmarks3.  Foreign trade with the eastern bloc and 
GDR peaked at nine percent of West Germany’s total foreign trade in 1975; though it 
declined after this point in terms of the percentage of trade, the value of West German 
trade with the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union continued to increase in real terms 
throughout the 1980s4.  And while the West’s trade with the eastern bloc would not make 
or break its economy, certain industries, among them the steel, energy, and banking 
industries, were much more dependent on their trade with the East; twenty percent of 
West German steel was shipped eastward by the mid-1970s5.  As these industries were 
often some of the most powerful corporate interests in Bonn, they had a 
disproportionately large effect on the push for greater economic integration.  Growth in 
West German trade with the East outpaced other Western countries throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s as well.  Between 1969 and 1988, the value of FRG trade to the eastern bloc 
increased by a factor of close to ten, from just over two billion dollars to more than 
nineteen billion.  No other western country came close to such growth; Italy, in second 
place in 1988, went from $1.4 billion in 1969 to close to seven billion dollars’ worth of 
                                                
3 Petzina 206 
4 Ash 244 
5 Ash 247 
trade in 19886.   By 1985 the FRG’s trade with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union 
was more than four times that of the United States.  West German companies also had 
premier roles in loans, joint ventures, and technological investments in the East7. 
 In the East, trade was heavily tilted toward the FRG.  By 1989, Soviet trade with 
the West Germans accounted for eighteen percent of its total trade with the West8.  In the 
mid-1980s, every Warsaw Pact country save Romania conducted at least one-third of its 
western trade to the FRG, with Hungary and the GDR’s shares far above that rate9.  It is 
no coincidence, then, that in the early to mid-1980s, Hungary and the GDR were unique 
in their opposition to Soviet foreign policy regarding détente and the missile crisis.  For 
these states, economic integration with the West was intrinsically linked with closer 
political ties—Hungary with Austria and, to a lesser extent, the FRG, and the GDR 
primarily with West Germany.  Indeed, Honecker’s attempt to visit the FRG in 1984 
caused his government, in the words of one scholar, to be “in the unfamiliar role of being 
in a tacit alliance with Hungary against the Soviet Union10.”  As trade with the West 
became increasingly important to those states, so too did political stability and the desire 
for improved relations.  Improving transportation and communication links between East 
and West may have appealed to Honecker on multiple levels, but the benefits to intra-
German trade certainly did not harm his willingness to cooperate on these measures.  As 
many of these improvements were bought with Western Deutschmarks, the benefits to 
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the East Berlin regime, highly strapped for cash by the time Kohl took power, were both 
widespread and increasingly critical to the state’s financial health. 
 Trade could thus be seen as the block upon which the détente of the 1970s and 
1980s was built.  Whereas the international system was fraught with change and 
uncertainty, economic ties between the Germanies were much steadier and bound the two 
states in a system where both had much to gain from continued détente and much to lose 
from a major deterioration in relations.  Additionally, the leading role of the Federal 
Republic as a western trade partner for the GDR, most of the Warsaw Pact, and the USSR 
itself helped to ease tensions between Bonn and those states, especially after the 
ascension of Gorbachev in 1985.  Although trade was not the only reason for the 
improving relationship between the FRG and the USSR after 1985, the strong links 
between the two economies certainly helped relations; Honecker’s 1987 state visit to 
Bonn would not have been possible if Moscow had loud objections.   But while direct 
trade was one of the most constant factors in the improving climate between the 
Germanies not the only area in which the FRG’s economic strength affected relations 
between East and West.  The diplomatic thaw between East and West Germany was 
again reinforced in 1983 by the extension of major credit lines to the GDR by the Federal 
Republic.  For years, the GDR had enjoyed a “swing” credit provided by the FRG to 
mitigate the effects of an economic crisis in the east.  After 1976, Honecker had at all 
times 100 million “DM liquid” available in credit from the Federal Republic; between 
that year and 1988 he drew 1.05 billion DM from the account “as a general hard currency 
fund to purchase foreign goods to rectify the chronic shortage” of consumer products11.  
This enough gave the East German leader reason to seek continued good relations with 
Bonn, but the loan extended in 1983 was of another order entirely.  In 1983, Bavarian 
Minister-President and erstwhile Kohl rival Franz-Josef Strauß engineered a one billion-
Deutschmark credit for the GDR, despite his image as a hardliner against the East 
German regime.  
 By that time, East Berlin was in desperate need of financial assistance, despite its 
public image—the economy of the GDR was long thought to be one of the strongest not 
only in the Eastern bloc but also in the world.  One estimate in 1977 placed its per capita 
GDP above Britain’s12.  In 1986, James McAdams argued in Foreign Affairs that “the 
bargaining relationship between East Berlin and Bonn can for the first time be 
characterized as symmetrical, if not inclined in East Germany’s favor,” due to the East’s 
presumed economic strength13.  Such characterizations were untrue and reflected both the 
doctored statistics published by the government and Western misconceptions of Eastern 
and Soviet power.  As the real situation in the East came to light, such assessments would 
change: in 1990, McAdams wrote that “East Berlin could no longer hope to resolve its 
massive economic problems without outside assistance14.”  By the time of unification, 
East Germany would accrue $26.5 billion in foreign debt; paying its interest took up sixty 
percent of the state’s export earnings15.  Already by the early 1980s, state ministers feared 
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a collapse in liquidity.  Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, head of East Germany’s 
Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung16, warned that the GDR economy could only 
maintain liquidity for a few years without a major hard currency injection17.  In 1983, the 
State Planning Commission of the GDR projected a deficit of DM 6.1 billion; during 
August and September of that year, “the GDR was essentially insolvent18.”  Strauß’ loan, 
then, was critically needed to prevent the state from financial ruin.  It was followed in 
1984 by another loan of DM 950 million19.  The loans, made by Deutsche Bank to the 
Deutsche Außenhandelsbank AG, East Germany’s state bank, were engineered and 
backed by the West German government20.  Interestingly, they were described and sold to 
the West German public through the language of “good neighborly relations,” as an 
“important contribution to deepening and stabilizing dialogue and cooperation…with the 
GDR,” and as a “revitalization of…relations with the GDR21.”  In return, the Honecker 
regime had to make concessions—expanded travel arrangements, especially for families, 
easing marriage restrictions, and removing the tripwire weapons at the German-German 
border22.  For the West Germans, loans to the GDR served multiple purposes.  First, they 
could be used as a political tool to show the humanity of the CDU government and its 
commitment to improving the lives of Germans, wherever they might live.  Kohl could, 
and did, argue that the question was essentially one of easing the financial pain in the 
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GDR in the context of its citizens.  Additionally, the loans allowed for the stabilization of 
the GDR government, always a prime concern of Kohl’s regime.  Finally, the ability of 
the FRG to advance credit, coupled with the GDR’s desperate need for the loans, created 
a situation in which the SED was increasingly reliant on the West to maintain its 
solvency.  Such reliance increased Bonn’s power at the expense of the East Germans and 
helped to advance the West’s policy goals.  East Germany was not alone in receiving 
credits from the FRG: in 1988, while Kohl visited Moscow, the Deutsche Bank extended 
a three billion Deutschmark credit to the USSR.  In response, Gorbachev remarked that 
“we have very many German friends23.”  Unlike the loans to the East, the USSR loans 
were made in the context of the Soviet leader’s enormous personal popularity in the 
West, but the underlying motives were similar: the promotion of improved relations, a 
tangible commitment to stability, and as a way to increase the FRG’s bargaining position 
in future debates over the status of the two German states. 
 A final, and perhaps more sinister, manner in which the détente of the 1980s was 
highly financial in nature was the evolution of ransom.  In 1962, the Protestant church in 
Germany made contact with Wolfgang Vogel, an eastern lawyer, and secured the release 
to West Germany of a small list of prisoners from the East24.  Their transit was paid with 
three truckloads of potash.  By 1963, the issue of Freikauf—the buying free of Eastern 
political prisoners and those separated by the inner border—had been integrated into the 
West German government.  In 1963, East Germany allowed eight political prisoners to be 
bought with cash; this number rose to 880 in 1964 and passed 1,000 by 196525.  In 1966, 
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the East German government created the KoKo specifically to handle such transactions26; 
by this point, the exchange of hard currency, material goods, and commodities was 
institutionalized on both sides of the border27.  For the East, such an arrangement was a 
major boon.  It allowed for the tidy disposal of political prisoners, which could now not 
only be sent west but also done so for a handsome profit.  Additionally, it allowed the 
East Berlin regime to stress its humanitarian credentials by allowing political prisoners to 
be taken out of its prisons28.  In the West, the purchases, like loans, were often used for 
political benefit.  They were an indication that one took seriously the Federal Republic’s 
stated position of providing for all Germans, regardless of which German state the 
individual lived in.  The Freikaufen were often tied to other, more innocuous payments, 
such as those made to reunite families, which also gave an air of humanitarian sacrifice.  
They also provided a common ground on which to begin negotiations; according to 
Schalck-Golodkowski of KoKo, “no government minister from West Germany would 
visit the GDR without a list of prisoners in his pocket as an appetizer for further 
negotiation in other areas29.”  Quietly, a significant number of the Freikauf payments 
were made in exchange for Western agents in the East30.  Between 1963 and 1989, the 
West German government “bought” the freedom of close to 34,000 political prisoners, 
reunited more than 2,000 children with parents, and expedited the resettlement of some 
quarter-million separated families for a total sum of DM 3.5 billion.  Bonn hoped to use 
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the buying-free to encourage more normal transit from East to West, as well as maintain 
its commitment to improving the lives of those for whom the separation of Germany 
caused hardship, or those who had landed in prison due to their agitation against the GDR 
government. 
 The Deutschmark, and more broadly economic policies, cannot be ignored in the 
evolution of stronger ties between the two German states.  Trade led the way; it was the 
first area in which the FRG and the GDR made significant contact and usually came in 
advance of, rather than after, major diplomatic and political breakthroughs.  East-West 
trade developed into a profitable and binding relationship in which both sides had 
practical reason to oppose any deterioration in relations.  By establishing a situation in 
which both the GDR and the FRG would lose valuable economic activity in the event of a 
showdown over the issues of the day, trade ties helped to avert such disagreements from 
occurring, or at least reaching their boiling point.  Trade ties were augmented by the 
FRG’s economic strength and ability to provide easy, low-interest credit to the GDR.  
Ironically, without the Deutsche Bank, symbol of West Germany’s capitalist system, the 
East would have had extreme difficulty making it through the 1980s.  Bankrupted by its 
constant need to import Western consumer goods, the East could not afford to keep its 
people satisfied without injections of cash.  Such infusions helped to stabilize the regime, 
but more importantly they forced East Berlin into a closer relationship with the West and 
opened the door to concessions.  The Freikaufen worked in roughly the opposite way: 
Honecker was able to bring the FRG government closer to his demands by allowing for 
the purchases, all the while ridding his state of costly and inexpedient dissidents.  The 
FRG’s willingness to seemingly pay any price—by the early 1980s, nearly DM 96,000 
per head31—allowed the East to set the terms of the exchanges and effectively control the 
flow of dissidents to the West for large profits.  While these purchases were unsavory, 
they were seen as progressive by the Western government and still helped to augment ties 
between the states.  The conversations that were struck up as a result of the Freikauf 
program helped lead to breakthroughs in other areas, especially visitation and 
infrastructure improvements to the border.  Similarly, the strings that came attached to 
Western loans, as well as Western money earmarked specifically for improvements or 
humanitarian concerns in the East, helped to establish a closer working relationship 
between the two states.   
It would be incorrect to say that economics were the driving force behind the 
rapprochement of East and West Germany during the 1980s.  Absent of an international 
situation instrumental in promoting a rational approach to German-German relations, as 
well as cooler heads in Bonn and Berlin, the increase in trade during the 1970s and 1980s 
would have likely remained just that—an increase in trade.  Yet it set the stage for a 
broader discussion of German questions, and when combined with the situational factors 
of the Kohl-Honecker era, trade served as an underlying source of stability in the states’ 
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Conclusions:  The Importance of 1987, Revisited 
 This paper has discussed three distinct mechanisms by which the two German 
states were able to improve their relations and work more closely in practical, concrete 
ways.  In reality, however, none of these existed in a vacuum.  The détente of the 1980s 
was not made possible because of a flare-up in tensions over nuclear missiles.  It was not 
begun by the agitations of a broad-based, popular consensus in opposition to nuclear 
brinksmanship in the Federal Republic or the simmering discontents of their counterparts 
in the GDR.  Nor was it the result of trade agreements, loans, or the Freikauf program.  
The German détente was not even the result of the accession of leadership more 
concerned with rational cooperation than ideological battle in the FRG or the GDR; after 
all, the process of détente had been going on long before Kohl took power and was 
expected by many observers to falter or fail to develop further under his leadership.  
Instead, what happened in Germany in the 1980s was the result of a unique combination 
of all of these factors.  Trade and economic ties provided a stable base for relations 
between the two states to improve, as it had since the 1960s.  But in 1982, the expected 
refreeze of the German détente that Kohl’s conservative government would supposedly 
bring never materialized.  The explanation for this lies in both the international climate of 
the era and with the leaders themselves. 
 The effect of the dual militarizations of Germany in 1979 and 1983 had a 
profound effect on rank-and-file citizens’ perception of the threat of the Cold War.  
Where previously the brinksmanship of the Cold War was primarily in terms of ICBMs, 
where a crisis could theoretically be defused before nuclear warheads reached 
Washington or Moscow, the new reality was a scenario in which missiles could reach 
major German population centers in a matter of seconds.  Suddenly, the prospect of an 
accidental or irrational nuclear conflict became a real fear.  In the event of a nuclear 
conflict, there would be no time for phone calls, talks, or eleventh-hour compromise.  
Warheads, launched from German soil, would destroy Germany, its people, and its 
civilization in less than a minute.  Missile placements across the FRG and GDR also 
placed targets across the countries, conceivably making no place beyond the target ranges 
of a nuclear launch.  These changes prompted a very real and legitimate fear across broad 
segments of German society—a Green election poster of the 1980s simply showed a map 
of the FRG with every nuclear site listed.  Even those favoring closer ties to NATO and a 
response to the SS-20 deployment were forced to reevaluate the effect such actions would 
have on their state. 
 More remarkable than the public outcry, though, was the reaction of the two 
German leaders.  Despite facing considerable pressure to freeze relations over Kohl’s 
support for the dual-track decision, Honecker instead remarked that the GDR 
government, “as genuine advocates of peace,” would instead be “guided by the popular 
wisdom that to negotiate ten times is always better than to fire a single shot1.”  On 
December 14, 1983 Kohl wrote to Honecker, “[ich] sehe in der Tat keine Alternative.  
Das gilt unabhängig davon, daß wir die Ursachen und Auswirkungen der derzeitigen 
Lage unterschiedlich bewerten2.”  The die was firmly cast in favor of dialogue and 
reason.  What had occurred was a significant and remarkably balanced evolution of 
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thought and policy on both sides of the German-German border.  In the West, a 
remarkable convergence on the importance of continuing the policies of Ostpolitik 
emerged within the Christian Democratic Union.  Although the party was divided on the 
degree to which the West should work to accommodate the GDR, by 1988 the language 
of Ostpolitik was more or less endorsed by the CDU at its Wiesbaden party conference3.  
And though these changes were largely driven by the emerging consensus within the 
CDU that liberalization could not be forced upon the GDR but rather would have to be 
essentially coaxed, the result was a pragmatic approach toward the East that was a key 
component of the improvement in German-German relations.  In the East, Honecker’s 
decision to seek consensus and improvement was personally risky.  It was highly opposed 
by Moscow, which saw the East as going directly against its foreign policy (it was).  
Eastern bloc leaders had been replaced for less, and Honecker above all knew this—he’d 
replaced Walter Ulbricht over ideological disagreements with Moscow in 1971.  But 
despite the bitter division his actions caused between Honecker and Chernenko, 
Honecker correctly decided that his state had more to gain by working with the FRG than 
by starting a major diplomatic incident over the NATO missile placement.  The result of 
these coordinated actions was that in an atmosphere of increasing international East-West 
tension, East-West relations in Germany became more cordial.  Despite being locked into 
opposing alliances, despite decades of antagonism between the CDU and the SED, and 
despite being led by two leaders who ideologically and in terms of background could not 
be further apart, the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic overcame 
many of the divisions of the early and mid-1980s.  They framed their decision in terms of 
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mutual responsibility to their people, to peace, and to Europe, and they led the way for 
the later international détente of the Gorbachev era. 
Early on, this paper posed the question of what to make of Erich Honecker’s 1987 
visit to Bonn.  In the context of the German Question’s ultimate fate, it is tempting to say 
that 1987 was, in fact, rather unimportant.  One could argue that the upheaval of 1989 
rendered the affirmation of Honecker’s government a moot point only two years after the 
fact.  But to view the détente of the 1980s through the lens of the collapse of the GDR 
and German unification would be a mistake.  Unification was never a foregone 
conclusion; indeed, practical observers did not see it as possible until things began to spin 
out of control in mid-1989.  As late as 1988, former chancellor Willy Brandt described 
the goal of reunification as the Federal Republic’s “life-long lie4.”  Instead, the détente of 
the 1980s must be viewed separately, and in that context, Honecker’s visit to Bonn in 
1987 was the capstone on years of calculated, often difficult decisions in favor of peace, 
better relations, and rationality in regards to the German question.  It was an affirmation 
of what had seemed improbable for so long—that an East German head of state could 
visit the West under peaceful conditions and be treated more or less as a visiting head of 
state.  The visit was rich in symbolism, poignant, and, at times, emotional, as when 
Honecker paid a visit to his former home in the Saarland.  Most importantly, it showed 
how far the two states had come and, concurrently, how far the international system had 
advanced to catch up to them.  Three years earlier, Chernenko had cancelled a similar 
trip, fearing an FRG propaganda trap and questioning Honecker’s commitment to the 
Warsaw Pact.  Now, the winds of change were blowing, and though neither Kohl nor 
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Honecker could possibly anticipate how far those winds would carry their two states, they 
were largely responsible for creating the liberalized atmosphere in which German-
German relations, and increasingly those of the entire Eastern and Western systems, were 
being conducted.  These developments, emanating from the center of Cold War 
division—from the very point where tensions should theoretically be highest—were 
remarkable.  Despite an international system aligned to discourage rapprochement in so 
many ways, a coalition of reason did prevail, and for that, Kohl and Honecker should be 
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